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1. Introduction: theory’s poster children
Practitioners and academics agree: bond contract terms are highly standardized and hard
to change.1 The dominant theory of contract change, based on network and learning
analysis, posits that market participants value uniformity. Everyone uses standard terms;
everyone knows what they mean. Market participants who trade boilerplate contracts
have no trouble pricing them. Lawyers who draft contract boilerplate can predict how
judges might interpret it.2 The down side of boilerplate is excess uniformity: change is
Key points
 In 2003, under official pressure, amendment provisions in standard form New York law sovereign
bond contracts shifted to resemble English law boilerplate.
 Market participants and officials expected contracts in New York and London to converge around
a common formulation.
 Contrary to expectations, the shift away from old boilerplate did not lead to convergence around new
boilerplate.
 Issuers in London, and to a lesser degree in New York, are experimenting with diverse terms and
institutional arrangements.
 Amendment provisions in recent issues have used hybrid formulations, permitting holders to vote in
person or by written consent, with different approval thresholds.
 More issuers are using trust structures.
 Creditor committees are making a qualified comeback, though the adoption and formulation of
committee provisons does not appear to track issuers’ credit quality.
 Not all issuers agree to pay committee expenses.
 Some issuers have agreed to require unanimous creditor consent to amend litigation-related terms,
even as financial terms can still be amended by qualified creditor majorities.
 None of these variations conform to traditional theoretical explanations for boilerplate change, which
credit leadership by large-volume market participants and official sector pressure. Nor were they
inadvertent.
 The role of industry groups and the difference in innovation practice in New York and London merit
further study.
* Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, Rutgers and Duke Law Schools.
1 See Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, ‘Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or ‘‘The Economics of
Boilerplate’’)’ (1997) 83 Va L Rev 713 (corporate bonds); see also Lee C. Buchheit, How to Negotiate Eurocurrency Loan Agreements,
ch 2 (2nd edn, 2000) (sovereign and corporate loans).
2 Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, ‘The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms’ (1985) 73 Cal L Rev 261.
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difficult to induce, even when the standard terms are suboptimal and technically easy
to fix. Innovation takes work, costs money and signals deviance3—the new term’s
meaning is uncertain, its proponents might be up to no good, and even if their motive is
perfectly benign, convincing the broader market is a hassle rarely worth the benefit of any
given term.
Recent contracts literature has suggested that network and learning effects make it
hard for all but the biggest actors to bear the cost of switching from boilerplate.4 Only the
highest volume issuers, bankers and lawyers can be confident that, if they switch clauses,
the minnows will follow and a new standard will be set.5 The minnows, who have limited
resources to innovate and cannot readily diffuse new clauses market-wide, will not switch
on their own for fear of producing bonds that no one knows how to price and that no
one wants to trade. We refer to this set of views on innovation as the ‘Big Player
Explanation’.
But even for the big fish, the innovation bar is high. Where contract change is a public
good, the official sector—governments, government groupings and institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—can cue a switch by reassuring the markets of
the new standard’s benefits and its prospects.6 We refer to this as the ‘Official Sector
Explanation’.
Both explanations were tested in the unlikely field of emerging market sovereign debt
between 1996 and 2003. During this period, governments in middle-income and
poor countries had over $300 billion in outstanding bonds governed by New York and
English law.7 New York law bonds contained provisions requiring the consent of every
bondholder to amend payment terms. English law bonds let the same terms be amended
with a relatively low bondholder majority. The difference matters because unlike
corporate and individual debtors, states cannot restructure their debts in bankruptcy.
No law and no judge can override the will of the bondholders. As a result, a typical
3 Omri Ben-Shahar and John A. E. Pottow, ‘On the Stickiness of Default Rules’ (2006) 33 Fla St U L Rev 651.
4 However, research on shareholder rights plans, poison pills and the adoption of LLP status reveals that deviation from
convention can emerge from smaller and less established players. See Michael J. Powell, ‘Professional Innovation: Corporate
Lawyers and Private Lawmaking’ (1993) 18 LSI 423; Scott Baker and Kimberly D. Krawiec, ‘The Economics of Limited Liability’
(2005) U Ill L Rev 107. In other areas of the law, scholars have found more willingness to experiment among smaller and lower
status players. For example, in their study of Silicon Valley law firms, Phillips and Zuckerman found that firms at the top and the
bottom of the corporate practice hierarchy were most likely to add a family law practice, which is traditionally low-status. Those at
the top often had the most to gain from innovation and were comfortable with their position in the hierarchy, whereas those at the
bottom had the least to lose and the most to gain from deviations. See Damon J. Phillips and Ezra W. Zuckerman, ‘Middle-Status
Conformity: Theoretical Restatement and Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets’ (2001) 107 Amer J Soc 379.
5 Kahan and Klausner (n 1); Stephen J. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical
Examination of Sovereign Bonds’ (2004) 53 Emory L J 929.
6 Robert B. Ahdieh, ‘Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the International Order’ (2004)
53 Emory L.J. 691, 735.
7 Gloria M. Kim, EMBI Global and EMBI Global Diversified: Rules and Methodology. J. P. Morgan Securities Inc., December 2004
(on file with authors). In mid-2003, the largest countries in the EMBI Global were Brazil, Mexico and Russia. Jonathan Bayliss,
Emerging Markets as an Asset Class. J. P. Morgan Securities Inc., September 2003 (on file with authors). Other countries frequently
included are Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Hungary, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Serbia, South Africa,
South Korea, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela and Vietnam. The older EMBIþ index includes fewer countries, has
higher liquidity requirements than EMBI Global, and excludes certain debt of parastatals and local governments. EMBI Global
Diversified includes the same countries as EMBIG, but caps the weighting of the largest issuers within the index. Kim, Ibid.
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New York law sovereign bond circa 1996 on its face gave each bondholder a veto over
debt restructuring.
This was not a theoretical problem: for over a century, emerging market sovereigns
have defaulted and restructured with depressing regularity.8 In the early days, absolute
sovereign immunity protected them from disgruntled creditors. In the 1980s debt crisis,
the creditors were overwhelmingly commercial banks. Banks were fewer and more likely
to have a long-term interest in the borrowing country. Their contracts were more
flexible than standard-form bonds. And they were willing to take a call from their finance
minister urging gentlemanly behaviour for the common good. The bondholders that
replaced banks in the 1990s were none of the above. Officials, lawyers and economists
worried aloud that in a crisis, the unanimous consent term in New York law bonds
would create holdout problems, exacerbate the effects of default and prolong economic
decline.9
Unanimity was a matter of custom, not law, in New York. Nevertheless, it proved
sticky. Beginning in 1996, the official sector launched a series of campaigns to promote
the shift to ‘collective action clauses’ (CACs) in New York law sovereign bonds as a
central part of its agenda for managing financial crises. Majority amendment topped the
CAC list. Officials called, cornered and cajoled finance ministers and their bankers. They
jawboned financial industry groups and sponsored drafting committees of ‘eminent
lawyers’ from jurisdictions around the globe. They promised to establish an international
bankruptcy regime that would bind holdouts by fiat.10 The market would not budge:
even creditors who held billions of dollars in English-law bonds with majority
modification terms resisted departure from unanimity under New York law.11
In 2003, with the threat of statutory sovereign bankruptcy hanging over the markets,
Mexico issued $1 billion in New York law bonds allowing modification of payment terms
with the consent of 75% of outstanding principal amount of the issue (Box 1). The move
was hailed as a watershed by officials and market participants alike. At the time, Mexico
was one of the largest and strongest issuers in the emerging market asset class.12 The
investment bankers and lawyers who worked on the deal were from the largest volume
firms in the business: Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton
and Sullivan & Cromwell.13 If theory needed proof, it could find no better: a widely
8 See Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff and Miguel A. Savastano, ‘Debt Intolerance’ (2003) BPEA 1.
9 Group of Ten, The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: A Report to the Ministers and Governors Prepared under the
Auspices of the Deputies (1996) (hereinafter Rey Report)5http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf4 (accessed 19 November 2008).
Barry Eichengreen et al., Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors (1995); James Hurlock and Troy Alexander,
‘The Fire Next Time: The Dangers in the Next Debt Crisis’ (1996) 15 IFLR 14; Lee C. Buchheit, ‘Making Amends for Amendments’
(1991) 10 IFLR 11; Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will’ (2003) 51 Emory L J 1317.
10 Gelpern and Gulati (n 10).
11 Rey Report (n 9); William W. Bratton and G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors’ (2004) 57
Vand L Rev 1, 56–61; Anna Gelpern and G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Public Symbol in Private Contracts: A Case Study’ (2006) 84 Wash U L R
1627.
12 Kim, (n 7). In mid-2003, the largest countries in the EMBI Global were Brazil, Mexico and Russia. Jonathan Bayliss, Emerging
Markets as an Asset Class. J. P. Morgan Securities Inc., September 2003 (on file with authors).
13 Choi and Gulati (n 5).
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Box 1
Mexico’s Collective Action Clause
[Excerpted from Pricing Supplement, United Mexican States, $1,000,000,000, 6.625
per cent Notes Due 2015 (26 February 2003)]
Meetings, amendments and waivers
Mexico may call a meeting of the holders of the notes at any time regarding the
fiscal agency agreement or the notes. Mexico will determine the time and place of the
meeting. Mexico will notify the holders of the time, place and purpose of the meeting
not less than 30 and not more than 60 days before the meeting.
In addition, the fiscal agent will call a meeting of the holders of the notes if the
holders of at least 10 per cent of the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding
notes have delivered a written request to the fiscal agent setting forth the action they
propose to take. The fiscal agent will notify the holders of the time, place and purpose
of any meeting called by the holders not less than 30 and not more than 60 days before
the meeting.
Only holders of notes and their proxies are entitled to vote at a meeting of holders.
Holders or proxies representing a majority of the aggregate principal amount of
the outstanding notes will normally constitute a quorum. However, if a meeting is
adjourned for a lack of a quorum, then holders or proxies representing 25 per cent of
the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding notes will constitute a quorum
when the meeting is rescheduled. For purposes of a meeting of holders that proposes
to discuss reserved matters, which are specified below, holders or proxies representing
75 per cent of the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding notes will constitute
a quorum. The fiscal agent will set the procedures governing the conduct of the
meeting.
Mexico, the fiscal agent and the holders may generally modify or take actions with
respect to the fiscal agency agreement or the terms of the notes:
 with the affirmative vote of the holders of not less than 66 2/3 per cent of the
aggregate principal amount of the outstanding notes that are represented at
a meeting; or
 with the written consent of the holders of 66 2/3 per cent of the aggregate principal
amount of the outstanding notes.
However, the holders of not less than 75 per cent of the aggregate principal amount of
the outstanding notes (emphasis added), voting at a meeting or by written consent,
must consent to any amendment, modification, change or waiver with respect to the
notes that would:
 change the due dates for the payment of principal of or interest on the notes;
 reduce any amounts payable on the notes;
88 Capital Markets Law Journal, 2009, Vol. 4, No. 1
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criticized provision stuck until the biggest market players teamed up with the world’s
most powerful governments to implement and spread a fix.
Mexico’s adoption of majority amendment provisions in February 2003 fit both the
Big Player and the Official Sector explanations. But it soon turned out that Mexico was
not first. Earlier CAC users, uncovered by researchers from the Reserve Bank of Australia,
were relatively marginal issuers like Kazakhstan and Lebanon, who used majority
amendment in New York law bonds as early as 1997.14 These issuers appeared to have no
knowledge of the official campaign for CACs; they did little to publicize their
innovations, and showed no desire to diffuse or take credit for them. And in the course of
our own research, practitioners showed us examples of CACs in New York law paper
 reduce the amount of principal payable upon acceleration of the maturity of the
notes;
 change the payment currency or places of payment for the notes;
 permit early redemption of the notes or, if early redemption is already permitted,
set a redemption date earlier than the date previously specified or reduce the
redemption price;
 reduce the percentage of holders of the notes whose vote or consent is needed to
amend, supplement or modify the fiscal agency agreement (as it relates to the
notes) or the terms and conditions of the notes or to take any other action with
respect to the notes or change the definition of ‘outstanding’ with respect to the
notes;
 change Mexico’s obligation to pay any additional amounts;
 change the governing law provision of the notes;
 change the courts to the jurisdiction of which Mexico has submitted, Mexico’s
obligation to appoint and maintain an agent for service of process in the Borough
of Manhattan, The City of New York or Mexico’s waiver of immunity, in respect of
actions or proceedings brought by any holder based upon the notes, as described in
the prospectus;
 in connection with an exchange offer for the notes, amend any event of default
under the notes; or
 change the status of the notes, as described under ‘Description of the Securities—
Debt Securities—Status’ in the prospectus.
We refer to the above subjects as ‘reserved matters’. A change to a reserved matter,
including the payment terms of the notes, can be made without your consent, as long
as a supermajority of the holders (that is, the holders of at least 75 per cent of the
aggregate principal amount of the outstanding notes) agree to the change.
14 Mark Gugiatti and Anthony Richards, ‘Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging
Markets’ (2003) 6 Intl Fin 415; Mark Gugiatti and Anthony Richards, ‘The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law
Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers’ (2004) 35 Geo J Intl L 815.
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going back to 1983,15 predating official engagement by more than a decade. No one
recalled the reasons for the clauses’ inclusion.
The authors of the Australian study that first uncovered pre-Mexico CACs speculated
that they were inadvertent—a product of form-copying by US law firms in the London
market. They cited these early cases as evidence of the CACs’ unimportance.16 Their
paper implied a view of contractual innovation different from both the Big Player and
the Official Sector explanations. We refer to it as the ‘Inadvertence Explanation’.
In hindsight, Mexico offers at best qualified support for the prevailing theories of
legal innovation, and leaves many questions unanswered. This article offers a glimpse
at the evolution of sovereign bond contracts after Mexico. Five years later, the press
corps has decamped and the officials have moved on. We set out to study a recent crop of
contracts to determine whether the boilerplate effect had locked in. Based on our review
of recent filings available on the Thomson Financial database, as of this writing, our
impression is that, while most issuers in New York have coalesced around a handful of
models—primarily Mexico’s first issue in 2003—and active experimentation continues
among relatively small issuers in the London market for both New York and English law
bonds.17 This in turn raises the possibility that pre-Mexico CACs were not an aberration
at all—or a product of mindless form-copying—but reflect a distinct mode of contractual
innovation.
For over a decade, the contracts literature has focused on the phenomenon of
standardization. Scholars asked how terms become standard, and why they change so
rarely. The emphasis on standardization painted a world where a standard term persists
until it is dislodged by another standard term, perhaps after a brief window of ferment
before the second term takes hold. But this framing overshadowed the early insights of
boilerplate theories, which described contracts as a mix of standard and customized
terms. Judicial interpretation attitudes, or network and learning effects, may prompt
suboptimal combinations. Our examples, along with the pre-Mexico CACs and recent
research on dispute resolution terms in sovereign debt contracts,18 bring the focus back
to the mix. The contracts we study suggest that standardization may be a matter of
degree, that the degree of standardization may vary across different markets, and that
a shock of the sort that led to Mexico’s 2003 issue may dislodge a previously standard
term without replacing it with a new standard—erstwhile boilerplate becomes a platform
for customization.
In what follows, we summarize several variations on CACs introduced since 2003, and
try to shed light on the forces that brought them into being. To find out how the new
clauses came about, we spoke to lawyers, bankers and officials in the field, and asked
15 Republic of Indonesia, $250,000,000 Floating Rate Notes due 1993, Prospectus dated 22 September 1983, 10.
16 Ibid.
17 In our study, we examine contractual terms as reported in the offering documents (offering circulars, prospectuses and
supplements).
18 Mark C. Weidemaier, ‘Disputing Boilerplate’ (unpublished draft dated July 2008) 5http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id¼11586114 (accessed 19 November 2008).
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them about their models, their negotiations, and the influence of academics, trade
associations and the official sector on the deals. Chastened by the belated discoveries of
pre-Mexico CACs, we do not claim that the clauses in our case studies are the first of
their kind. In many cases, we point out that they are not. However, they do represent
departures from what academics, officials and many practitioners appear to regard as
boilerplate.
2. Boilerplate in flux
To meet or not to meet: Gabon and Ghana
Before 2003, holders of New York law sovereign bonds could, in theory, amend the
financial terms of their bond contracts by mailing a ballot to that effect to the fiscal agent
of the sovereign issuer. Because every single holder had to vote in favour of the
amendment (abstentions count as votes against), any such effort was doomed to failure,
which may explain why no sovereign had ever bothered to test the process. Instead,
New York law bonds containing unanimity provisions were restructured in debt
exchanges: participating creditors exchanged old contracts for new ones with different
terms; their old contracts were cancelled. Dissenters kept the old bonds, were free to sue,
and were usually paid off in accordance with the old terms.19
Standard-form English law contracts provided for amendment at bondholder
meetings. Financial terms could normally be changed by a vote of 75 per cent of a
bondholder quorum. The quorum ranged from 75 per cent to 25 per cent of outstanding
principal at a postponed meeting. In theory, this allowed debt restructuring with the
blessing of less than 20 per cent of the debt. Dissenters were bound to the new terms.
But creditor meetings could be a double-edged sword. One of the early emerging market
bond exchanges of the 1990s, which targeted English law contracts, was structured to
preempt a face-to-face meeting for fear that creditors acting collectively were more likely
to rebel. Ukraine asked participating holders to give their proxy to the restructuring
agent, but no meeting could be called until proxies representing 75 per cent of the total
were received.20
Mexico’s February 2003 issue under New York law permitted amendment of financial
terms and several other provisions (‘Reserved Matters’) with the consent of creditors
holding 75 per cent of outstanding principal obtained in writing or at a meeting.21 For
non-reserved matters, the threshold varied depending on whether the vote was taken
at a meeting (English model) or in writing (New York model). Mexico’s formulation
appears to have become standard in New York. Variations were rare. Uruguay’s
introduction of aggregation provisions, which allowed simultaneous amendment of
19 See Lee C. Buchheit, ‘How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap’ (2000) 19 IFLR 17.
20 Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises (2006) 128.
21 ‘Mexico Prospectus’, Pricing Supplement, United Mexican States, $1,000,000,000, 6.625% Notes Due 2015 (26 February 2003)
PS-7. 5http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101368/000095012303002091/y83744b3e424b3.htm4 (accessed 19 November
2008)
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multiple issues, was the most notable among these; it has since been adopted by
Argentina and several smaller issuers.22
In December 2007, The Gabonese Republic, a small, oil-rich African dictatorship,
issued $1 billion in notes in London, governed by New York law.23 The issue was
Gabon’s first in recent memory; the notes were rated BBby Standard & Poors and
Fitch Ratings, a speculative investment. Nevertheless, Gabon apparently secured more
flexibility in its amendment provisions than Mexico, a much larger, investment-grade oil
exporter with a glowing reputation for professionalism in debt management.
Should Gabon wish to amend key terms of its bonds, it may solicit the written consent
of 75 per cent of outstanding principal—or use the traditional English approach of
calling a meeting and winning over 75 per cent of a quorum.24 With the lower quorum
requirement for a postponed meeting, Gabon could in theory restructure the notes with
a mere 25 per cent of its creditors, binding the rest. Gabon’s combination of English
and New York CAC styles was unusual.25 It was made possible in part because this
New York law bond was being offered in the United Kingdom, to investors familiar and
comfortable with the UK style meeting provisions.
The combined formulation reflects an implicit tradeoff. If the issuer seeks to restruc-
ture by mail, it must deal with a higher voting threshold, and the fact that inattentive
bondholders who fail to cast their ballots count as votes against modification. On the
other hand, if it is willing to look bondholders in the eye at a meeting and risk catalysing
creditor rebellion, Gabon might benefit from a lower amendment threshold.
Shortly before Gabon went to market with its New York-law issue, the Republic of
Ghana, another speculative-grade African borrower, sold $750 million in notes governed
by English law.26 Ghana’s amendment provisions are like Gabon’s—blending what had
been distinct New York and English law conventions. Creditors can vote to change
Reserve Matters in writing, which requires 75 per cent of outstanding principal, or meet
and amend with 75 per cent of the quorum (two-thirds of outstanding principal, reduced
to one-third by postponement).
Gabon’s and Ghana’s CACs appear to contradict all three of the explanations for
boilerplate change that we flagged earlier. They were small and weak players in the
sovereign debt market. Their lawyers were highly regarded, but did not stand out for the
sheer volume of their sovereign representation in the way that Mexico’s lawyers Cleary,
Gottlieb had in New York.27 Citi co-managed both Gabon’s and Ghana’s issues and has
22 Voting thresholds for reserved matters initially ranged from 75% to 90%, but by and large have settled around 75%.
23 Prospectus, The Gabonese Republic, $1,000,000,000, 8.2% Notes Due 2017 (5 December 2007).
24 Gabon Prospectus (n 23) 90.
25 Shortly before the Gabon issue in London, Grenada issued a bond in New York borrowing some features of English law—most
importantly, removing the individual right to sue. See Lee C. Buchheit and Elizabeth Karpinski, ‘Grenada’s Innovations’ (2006)
21 J Intl Bank Regul 227. Lee Buchheit, the term’s author and a large-volume intermediary himself, noted that this was the first case
of combining US and English-law forms in recent memory.
26 Offering Circular, The Republic of Ghana, $750,000,000, 8.5% Notes Due 2017 (2 October 2007).
27 Choi and Gulati (n 5).
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been prominent in the sovereign market for some time; however, we found no indication
that the lead managers in either deal had expressed a preference for this particular CAC
formulation, nor did we discern any broader consistency among Citi-managed sovereign
issues. The Big Player Explanation appears implausible. The Official Sector Explanation
does no better. Our interviews for this project, in contrast to our earlier investigation of
Mexico’s CAC issue in 2003, revealed no pressure from the IMF, the US Treasury and the
Bank of England to induce these modifications. Our official contacts seemed largely
unaware of them. The remaining hypothesis—Inadvertence—was vigorously contra-
dicted by the lawyers involved in the deals.28 All appear to have been cognizant of what
they were doing and why—including reasons for using different thresholds for votes
taken in meetings and in writing—and some recounted negotiations leading up to the
CAC formulas they used. In both London-based deals, the participants had closely
followed the debates over New York CACs, read private sector and official reports on the
clauses, and said that they consciously selected aspects of US documentation practice that
they considered sensible and favourable.
Committees return: from Hungary to Georgia, via Abu Dhabi
Sovereign bond restructuring is a venerable practice—it goes back over 100 years.
However, until the middle of the 20th century, bondholders could not sue defaulting
sovereigns in court.29 Lobbying their own governments was usually their only path to
recovery. To that end, creditors in the United Kingdom and later in the United States
organized bondholder protective committees to coordinate their approach to the debtors
and their own foreign ministries.30 After a nasty series of defaults in the 1930s, the
sovereign bond market died for half a century. When middle-income developing
countries returned to the markets in the 1970s, they borrowed from commercial banks in
the form of syndicated loans. Beginning in 1982, the loans were restructured through
bank advisory committees, where the largest banks with the greatest exposure to the
distressed debtor coordinated the rest, advised by lawyers and other experts hired at the
sovereign’s expense.31
The return of sovereign bonds on a large scale in the early 1990s and the return of
sovereign bond restructuring a few years later marked a change: for the first time in
recent memory, issuers faced a large, diffuse group of bondholders that had no
centralized representation and no apparent means of coordinating among themselves.
The prevailing wisdom was that a dispersed creditor body would encourage holdout
behaviour and hurt the debtor.32 Sovereigns responded with unilateral exchange offers
28 A critic might point out that, of course, lawyers would never concede inadvertence. In our conversations, the lawyers went
beyond simply denying inadvertence, sharing specific models, tables comparing different formulations and negotiation anecdotes
explaining why they had made the relevant changes.
29 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting A-G Philip B. Perlman (19 May 1952), reprinted
in 26 Dept St Bull 984, 984–85 (1952).
30 For a summary, see Rory Macmillan, ‘Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-out System’ (1995) 16 Nw J Intl L Bus 57, 80–84.
31 See Alfred Mudge, ‘A Perspective of Counsel to Agent Banks, Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks’ in William
N. Eskridge Jr (ed.), A Dance Along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of the International Debt Problem (1985).
32 Gelpern and Gulati (n 10).
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that built on more-or-less broad-based outreach to creditors. In all but one recent case,
these offers attracted over 85 per cent of the bondholders.33 Argentina was the exception,
with just over three-quarters of the holders participating. In this largest and most
contentious restructuring in recent history, groups of domestic and foreign creditors
tried to organize themselves in various ways, but ultimately proved unable to bind
one another and, for the most part, accepted Argentina’s terms.34
Beginning in the mid-1990s, some practitioners, academics and officials called for
reviving creditor committees to coordinate within and among different debt issues.35
However, these calls did not get enough support to be among the CACs drafted by
a panel of ‘eminent lawyers’ representing debtors and creditors under the auspices of the
Group of Ten (G-10).36 Instead, the eminent ones advocated coordinating creditors
within a single debt instrument using trust structures and permitted the appointment of
a creditor representative to engage in restructuring negotiations.37 Early CAC issuers in
New York similarly rejected committees. But some creditor groups and veterans of 1980s
restructurings persisted. Creditor committees were discussed in the 2004 Principles for
Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets (the Principles),
endorsed by two large-trade associations and a group of emerging markets issuers.38 The
Principles did not take a firm position on the merits of committees as a means of creditor
organization, but noted that in the past, issuers had paid committee expenses. Unlike the
G-10 clauses, model clauses produced by one of the trade groups included a committee
provision (Box 2).
None of the prominent sovereigns endorsing the Principles changed their contracts
to provide for committees or any other version of the engagement clause. Several
smaller emerging market issuers in New York used trust structures on the G-10 model,
as did Spain and the United Kingdom (reportedly to advance good documentation
33 Ibid, 91, n 407.
34 Giselle Datz, ‘What Life after Default? Time Horizons and the Outcome of the Argentine Debt Restructuring Process’ RIPE
(arguing that creditor dispersion favours the sovereign); Anna Gelpern, After Argentina (Inst. for Intl Econ., Policy Brief No. PB05-
02, 2005),5http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb05-2.pdf4 (accessed 19 November 2008) (observing that creditor committees
formed during Argentina’s restructuring quickly broke ranks).
35 Macmillan (n 30); Eichengreen et al., (n 9); John B. Taylor, ‘Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A US Perspective’, Speech at the Conference on Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards,
Institute for International Economics (2 April 2002) 5http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID¼4554
(accessed 19 November 2008), Banque de France Staff, ‘Towards a Code of Good Conduct on Sovereign Debt Re-Negotiation’
(January 2003)5http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/2003/etud7_0603.pdf4 (accessed 17 November 2008).
The French central bank proposal was incorporated in the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in
Emerging Markets (‘Principles’). The Principles were released jointly by the Institute of International Finance, International
Primary Markets Association (since merged into International Capital Markets Association), and several key emerging markets
issuers in the fall of 2004. See Inst. Of Intl Fin., ‘Principles for the Emerging Markets’5http://www.iif.com/emp/principles/4
accessed 19 September 2008; Press Release, Sovereign Issuers of International bonds, the Inst. of Intl Fin., and the Intl Primary Mkt.
Assoc., Key Principles Agreed To Strengthen Emerging Markets Finance (22 November 2004)5http://www.icma-group.org/getdoc/
e316e335-c63d-4fca-9801-def086bf7ecd/221104-Principles-Pressrelease-PDF.aspx?4 (accessed 17 November 2008).
36 Group of Ten, ‘Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses’ (26 September 2002)5http://www.bis.org/publ/
gten08.pdf4 (accessed 19 November 2008).
37 Ibid. The restructuring representative term does not mention expenses. Different representation structures are compared in Lee
C. Buchheit, ‘The Collective Representation Clause’ (1998) 17 IFLR 9.
38 The Principles (n 35).
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Box 2
ICMA Model Creditor Committee Clause
[Excerpted from the International Capital Market Association Standard Collective
Action Clauses for Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes (English Law, Fiscal
Agency Structure) 28 October 2004]a
[] Noteholders’ Committee
(a) Appointment: the Noteholders may, by a resolution passed at a meeting of
Noteholders duly convened and held in accordance with the Fiscal Agency
Agreement by a majority of at least 50 per cent in aggregate principal amount of
the Notes then outstanding, or by notice in writing to the Issuer (with a copy to
the Fiscal Agent) signed by or on behalf of the holders of at least 50 per cent in
aggregate principal amount of the Notes then outstanding, appoint any person or
persons as a committee to represent the interests of the Noteholders if any of the
following events has occurred:
(i) an event of default;
(ii) any event or circumstance which could, with the giving of notice, lapse of time,
the issuing of a certificate and/or fulfilment of any other requirement provided
for in Condition [] (‘events of default’) become an event of default; or
(iii) any public announcement by the Issuer, to the effect that the Issuer is seeking
or intends to seek a restructuring of the Notes (whether by amendment,
exchange offer or otherwise), provided, however, that no such appointment
shall be effective if the holders of more than 25 per cent of the aggregate
principal amount of the outstanding Notes have either:
(A) objected to such appointment by notice in writing to the Issuer (with
a copy to the Fiscal Agent) during a specified period following notice of
the appointment being given (if such notice of appointment is made
by notice in writing to the Issuer) where such specified period shall be
either 30 days or such other longer or shorter period as the committee
may, acting in good faith, determine to be appropriate in the
circumstances, or
(B) voted against such resolution at a meeting of Noteholders duly
convened and held in accordance with the Fiscal Agency Agreement.
Such committee shall, if appointed by notice in writing to the Issuer,
give notice of its appointment to all Noteholders in accordance with
Condition [] (‘Notices’) as soon as practicable after the notice is
delivered to the Issuer.
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practices)—but none of them used committees.39 Beginning in 2004, smaller middle-
income issuers like Hungary, Latvia, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovakia, and a few wealthy
ones like Abu Dhabi and Sweden, gave bondholders an option to establish committees for
their issue, and to deputize them to interact with other creditors in a debt restructuring.
With the exception of two offerings in the United States, the practice appears largely
confined to London, and is not standard even there.40 In their 2007 English law offerings,
(b) Powers: such committee in its discretion may, among other things,
(i) engage legal advisers and financial advisers to assist it in representing the
interests of the Noteholders,
(ii) adopt such rules as it considers appropriate regarding its proceedings,
(iii) enter into discussions with the Issuer and/or other creditors of the Issuer,
(iv) designate one or more members of the committee to act as the main point(s)
of contact with the Issuer and provide all relevant contact details to the Issuer,
(v) determine whether or not there is an actual or potential conflict of interest
between the interests of the holders of the Notes then outstanding and the
interests of the holders of debt securities of any one or more other series
issued by the Issuer and
(vi) upon making a determination of the absence of any actual or potential
conflict of interest between the interests of the holders of the Notes then
outstanding and the interests of the holders of debt securities of any one or
more other series issued by the Issuer, agree to transact business at a
combined meeting of the committee and such other person or persons as may
have been duly appointed as representatives of the holders of securities of
each such other series.
Except to the extent provided in this paragraph (b) (‘Powers’), such committee shall
not have the ability to exercise any powers or discretions which the Noteholders could
themselves exercise.
The Issuer shall pay any fees and expenses which are reasonably incurred by any
such committee or any such combined committee (including, without limitation, the
costs of giving notices to Noteholders, fees and expenses of the committee’s legal
advisers and financial advisers, if any) within 30 days of the delivery to the Issuer of a
reasonably detailed invoice and supporting documentation.
ahttp://www.icmagroup.org/market_practice/Advocacy/collective_action/eu_collective_action.html
(accessed 19 November 2008).
39 As has Spain in its Multi Term Note filing done in October 2004. In the US context, as we discuss later, Iraq used a trust
structure in its post-Saddam restructuring.
40 Hungary’s issue with committees under New York law is an exception, along with the more recent issuance by Congo in April
2008; we discuss it below. Prospectus Supplement, Republic of Hungary, $1,500,000,000, 4.75% Notes Due 2015 (1 January 2005)
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for example, Austria, Ghana, Pakistan and Morocco, failed to provide for committees,
or to include any other form of an engagement clause.
The Republic of Georgia is one of the most recent sovereigns to provide for
committees; it did so in its April 2008 offering in London. Closely tracking the
trade association model advanced in conjunction with the Principles, Georgia permits
50 per cent of its Noteholders, acting in writing or at a meeting, to establish a committee
after an Event of Default, an adverse development that could become an Event of Default,
or announcement of debt restructuring plans. The committee may hire professional
advisers and negotiate with the issuer and other creditor groups. Georgia agreed to pay
expenses.41
The clause is generally perceived as creditor-friendly; it would be most valuable to
creditors facing a real probability of restructuring in the near term. Therefore, it might be
expected to appear among the riskiest borrowers.42 Georgia fits the bill: it is a speculative-
grade issuer that has suffered non-stop civil strife and conflict with Russia since its
independence in 1991.43
Yet, the broader pattern of engagement clause adoption in London and its selective
adoption in New York do not support this explanation. One of the world’s richest states,
Abu Dhabi, agreed to committees. On the other hand, neither Gabon nor Ghana did.
Investors and managers there showed no sign of demanding them. The most notable
variation on engagement involves Hungary: an investment-grade borrower, it used
engagement clauses in its late 2004 and early 2005 offerings.44 The 2004 English law
offering document discloses the usual industry-model engagement clause; however,
less than a year later, Hungary’s New York law issue included an engagement clause
without an undertaking to pay the committee’s expenses. Hungary may have used its
creditworthiness and the growing appetite for emerging market debt at the time to take
the bite out of the clause. But the beleaguered Republic of Congo (Congo–Brazzaville),
issuing New York law bonds out of a restructuring in 2007, also avoided committing to
pay committee expenses: under Congo’s indenture, the issuer is not obligated to
recognize the committee, and does not pay its expenses until after recognition. On the
other hand, issuers like Abu Dhabi, with as much or more bargaining power than
Hungary, either did not try, or tried and failed to change the expense term.
Even without the engagement clause, nothing prohibits bondholders from appointing
a representative or a committee to act for them. Limiting the circumstances under which
a committee could be appointed without the offsetting benefit of expense reimbursement
and The Republic of Congo as Issuer and HSBC Bank USA, N.A., Trust Indenture dated as of 15 November 2007, U.S. Dollar Notes
Due 2029, 41.
41 Prospectus, Georgia, $750,000,000, 7.5% Notes Due 2013 (11 April 2008) 80.
42 Cf. Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody, ‘Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?’(2000) National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 74585http://www.nber.org/papers/w7458.pdf4(accessed 19 November 2008). This early
study of majority amendment provisions argues that poorly rated issuers would be the most likely to suffer a price penalty when
departing from unanimity.
43 Georgia Prospectus (n 41) 10–11.
44 Offering Circular, Republic of Hungary, Euro 1,000,000,000, 4.5% Notes Due 2014 (28 January 2004); Hungary Prospectus
Supplement (n 40).
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arguably turns engagement into a pro-debtor term. At best, such a clause provides
a roadmap for creditor coordination, and may shame the debtor on the margins into
talking to its creditors. Some creditor representatives told us this symbolic function was
critical. Others were sceptical. Neither the documents nor our interviews offer a coherent
explanation for the differences among the issuers using the clause. One practitioner
suggested that the market was going through a temporary period of experimentation.
With engagement clauses as with the rest, the prevailing explanations for boilerplate
change fail to account for the sporadic pattern of adoption of engagement clauses. Few of
the adopters were Big Players or intermediaries in the relevant market. No one sought
to trumpet their use of engagement or to diffuse it for the sake of enhancing their
market reputation. The Official Sector—the IMF and the Bank of England—monitored
adoption, but did not press for committees.45 At least for the earliest adopters in
2004–2005, inadvertence did not apply: engagement provisions were new; there were no
old contracts to cut and paste.
To date, the model language drafted by the International Primary Market Association
[IPMA, now part of the International Capital Market Association (ICMA)] prevails
among the adopters. Unlike other trade association drafting efforts described in the
contracts literature, this set of model terms did not codify existing practice, but
attempted to change it46—with some success. However, association officials closely
associated with the drafting effort insisted that they did not drive the diffusion, partly
because trade groups disagreed among themselves. The groups’ influence in individual
deals is hard to gauge. No one claimed to have adopted the engagement clause in
deference to industry preference, though many were aware of industry support. Some
cited investor demand, especially among bondholders who went through Argentina’s
bruising restructuring. Some lawyers argued that in the absence of a trust structure,
committees may facilitate discussions between the debtor and creditors as a group in the
event of a default, and were therefore worth the expense. But some issuers, notably
Congo–Brazzaville, had both a trust structure and an engagement clause. Several issuer
lawyers who rejected engagement clauses countered that such clauses achieved little: the
committees had limited power to negotiate, while multiple committees risked working
at cross-purposes, and complicating a workout at the issuer’s expense. At this writing,
English law bonds issued by Seychelles are being restructured using a committee
constituted under the bonds. In an ironic twist, the creditors are represented by
a prominent issuers’ counsel. The lead creditor Lehman Brothers, filed for bankruptcy
reorganization in the middle of the restructuring talks. The experience may change the
market’s view of engagement clauses going forward.
45 The United Kingdom’s use of trust structures in its own bonds was an attempt to lead by example, to promote the diffusion
of the trust structure in emerging markets bonds.
46 Goetz and Scott (n 2); Kevin E. Davis, ‘The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate’ (2006) 104 Mich L Rev 1075
for a broader discussion of the nonprofits’ role. Groups such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) generally portray their efforts as codifying and standardizing existing market
practices. No issuer had used creditor committees before IPMA and IIF put forward their version of the engagement clause.
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Unanimity revival
Perhaps the most peculiar recent variation on CACs is the quiet revival of unanimous
consent to modify a subset of contract terms. At least four sovereigns, Georgia, Lithuania,
Serbia and Seychelles agreed to give every bondholder the right to veto changes
to contract terms that may affect creditor capacity to sue the issuer. For example, in
Georgia’s case, changing choice of law, consent to jurisdiction, maintaining an agent for
service of process and waiver of sovereign immunity all require unanimous consent.47
The payment terms of Georgia’s bonds may be changed with the consent of 75 per cent of
outstanding principal amount. If it were to get the 75 per cent approval, the Republic of
Georgia could ‘amend’ the principal amount of its notes to reduce it to zero. But Georgia
cannot change the governing law from English to New York unless every single one of its
creditors is awake and favourably inclined.
The move to unanimity is puzzling: it had taken years of effort to get the US
market to follow the UK majority amendment model. And now, after the US market
had abandoned unanimity, issuers in the United Kingdom were embracing it? One
explanation we heard was that unanimity aims to assuage small investors’ fear of being
outvoted by large ones, with more bargaining power to secure restructuring terms they
liked. In this context, the small dissenters would at least retain the capacity to sue. Yet it
is difficult to see what they would sue for once the financial terms had been amended.
And even if the new unanimity provision succeeded at protecting the small litigant, this
goal is itself diametrically opposed to a central goal of the CAC campaign: blocking
minority holdout litigation. A truly effective provision enabling minority holdout
litigation would revive the rigidities of the pre-2003 New York practice; New York
and London would switch places.
The roots of unanimity requirements for non-financial terms likely go back to
Ecuador’s use of exit consents in its 1999 Brady bond exchange. Before financial terms in
New York law bonds could be amended by a qualified majority, Ecuador’s lawyers
borrowed a corporate debt restructuring tactic: they asked creditors participating in the
exchange to vote on their way out to amend bond terms that were not subject to
unanimity.48 Under the drafting convention of the day, these included status (priority),
governing law, choice of forum and submission to jurisdiction, among others. Thus
amended, the old bonds became effectively unenforceable. Fear of being left holding
worthless bonds boosted participation, but enraged some bondholders.49 One New York-
based creditor association proposed raising the threshold for amending such provisions
to 95 per cent, on par with its proposal for financial terms. London-based IPMA
proposed unanimity. IPMA’s clause is now being adopted sporadically in London, by
sovereigns like Georgia.50
47 Georgia Prospectus (n 41) 79.
48 Buchheit (n 19).
49 Felix Salmon, ‘The Buy Side Starts to Bite Back’ Euromoney (April 2001).
50 EMCA, Model Covenants for New Sovereign Debt Issues (3 May 2002)5http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/model.pdf4 (accessed
19 November 2008). IPMA, Standard Collective Action Clauses (CACs) for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes (8 October
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New York’s response to Ecuador was different. Answering investor demands in its 2003
CAC launch, Mexico included a similar range of provisions in the definition of Reserved
Matters, amendable on par with financial terms. The vote required was 75 per cent of
principal outstanding, significantly less than unanimity and consistent with the broader
objective of deterring holdout litigation.51
As with the meeting and engagement provisions, the shift to unanimity does not fit any
of the three prevailing explanations for boilerplate change: none of the innovators were
big players, none of the early adopters sought to publicize the change to diffuse it or
enhance their prestige, the official sector was uninvolved and apparently unaware. The
unanimity provisions were negotiated and new—not inadvertent. However, as with
committee-style engagement clauses, unanimity’s prospects were clearly better for being
part of the IPMA clause package.
3. Conclusions: innovation questions
Soon after Mexico’s CAC launch in 2003, a leading London-based participant in
sovereign debt debates of the day noted, ‘[t]he markets would welcome standardization;
it is important that these clauses be as uniform as possible. . . . The least desirable
outcome would be for a particular issuer’s CACs to become a source of competition . . .’52
Yet five years later and despite widespread perception to the contrary among officials and
academics, the market is rife with quiet experimentation. In our snapshot focusing
primarily on the London market, we found at least five variations on amendment
procedures, voting thresholds and creditor coordination mechanics.53 Some had roots in
financial industry efforts to change market practice, others appeared to migrate from
New York, yet others looked original. We also found new evidence that pre-Mexico CACs
unearthed since 2003 used diverse, highly customized formulations—unlikely to be the
product of inadvertent cutting and pasting.54 This pattern of innovation raises new
questions for theory and practice.
2004) 5http://www.icma-group.co.uk/getdoc/c4a386a7-afc4-47fb-92a5-94f4e651de0a/CACs-Clauses-Section-VII-No-8-Oct-2004-
PDF.aspx?4 (accessed 17 November 2008).
51 Mexico Prospectus (n 21).
52 Robert B. Gray, ‘Collective Action Clauses’, Remarks Prepared for Delivery at UNCTAD Fourth Inter-Regional Debt
Management Conference, Geneva (11 November 2003) 12.
53 Among the differences we do not discuss in detail here are those relating to ‘Reserved Matters’—key terms whose amendment
requires the highest supermajority. As noted earlier, in addition to payment terms previously subject to unanimity, a range of
clauses that could have been modified by simple majority before 2003 were elevated to reserve status. The list of such newly elevated
terms has varied among issuers. Most, if not all, of the post 2003 US law sovereign issuances we examined elevated the status or pari
passu clause. They did not, however, elevate the status clause’s cousin, the negative pledge clause. In the United Kingdom, since
2003, many sovereigns followed the same practice; however, at least two chose to elevate the negative pledge clause instead of status
clause. Yet another chose to elevate both the negative pledge and the status clause. These variations may offer important insights
into the market participants’ understanding of the underlying clauses; however, a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this
article.
54 For example, Lebanon’s 1997 issue contains a 75% amendment and a 75% quorum threshold, but the latter does not go down
at postponed meetings, as had been the custom in the United Kingdom. Even granting that the clause is a product of some form-
copying, it matches neither the US nor the UK template. This means either that the drafters came up with a brand new formulation,
or that they tried to get the more favourable UK formulation, but had to negotiate down. Neither is inadvertent. Offering Circular,
Republic of Lebanon, $100,000,000, 7.5% Notes Due 2007 (30 June 1997).
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Contract boilerplate literature suggests that big players drive innovation, occasionally
with the assistance of the official sector. But the most innovative recent CACs all came
from relatively minor issuers in the sovereign debt market, owing either to their small size
or relatively infrequent borrowing. The investment banks that managed the issues were
bigger fish, but we saw little hint of a documentation preference pattern among lead
managers: one of the leading banks, for example, had at least four different variants of
CACs out of London after 2003. The law firms representing issuers were highly respected,
but hardly high-volume intermediaries. There was no evidence that innovation was being
driven by one or two firms (or lawyers) with a large sovereign practice as appeared to
be the case in New York.
Also contrary to theory’s predictions, few of the lawyers involved seemed eager to
trumpet their documentation practices as innovative or make any overt effort at their
diffusion. Most described themselves as simply representing their clients to get the best
deal acceptable to both sides. If anything, they were reluctant to have attention drawn to
their deals. This pattern contradicts boilerplate theory’s view of reputation-driven
innovation by large players, and other theories’ portrayal of small, disruptive innovators
seeking to break into a market. In contrast, Lee Buchheit, a partner at Cleary, Gottlieb in
New York who represents many sovereign issuers, exemplifies theory: he has a large
sovereign practice, regularly publishes articles on his clients’ innovations, and brings
them to the attention of the official sector.55
The story of government-driven innovation—the Official Sector Explanation, which
dominated accounts of Mexico’s CAC launch—also fails in this case. Conversations
with officials and market participants revealed no IMF or US Treasury involvement in
the recent deals, and a nearly complete drop-off in high-level official engagement on
CACs. The IMF operational guidance still encourages states to adopt CACs (defined as
including, but not limited to, majority amendment and majority enforcement) as an
element of good debt management practices during annual economic policy consulta-
tions,56 but it does not delve into drafting particulars. The Fund also offers occasional
updates on CAC implementation57; however, these have become less frequent in recent
years. In the absence of new emerging market debt crises, other policy priorities
took over.
On the other hand, the influence of trade associations and their efforts to diffuse the
Principles bears further study. Two terms sporadically adopted in London—creditor
committees and unanimity to amend litigation-related terms—were part of a new
template drafted by IPMA/ICMA and supported by the Institute of International Finance
(IIF). The industry language has become part of the mix considered more or less critically
55 For example, Lee C. Bucbheit and Jeremiah S. Pam, ‘Uruguay’s Innovations’ (2004) 19 J Intl Bank Regul 28; Lee C. Buchheit
and Elizabeth Karpinski, ‘Grenada’s Innovations’ (2006) 21 J Intl Bank Regul 227; ‘Belize’s Innovations’ (2007) Butterworths J Intl
Banking & Fin 278.
56 Berhnard Fritz-Krockow and Parmeshwar Ramlogan (eds), Internatoinal Monetary Fund Handbook: Its Functions, Policies and
Operations (2007) 64.5http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/imfhb/eng/handbook.pdf4 (accessed 19 November 2008).
57 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues, ch 1 (2006) 465http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/GFSR/2006/01/pdf/chp1.pdf4 (accessed 19 November 2008).
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by London-based counsel in documenting an emerging market sovereign bond. However,
there is limited evidence that industry-supported terms have become the new boilerplate.
Would CACs have taken hold in New York in the absence of official pressure, much as
they had in an early subset of London issues under New York law? Lawyers, officials and
trade association representatives involved in the shift have variously raised this possibility
with us; however, all seemed to agree that once the official sector adopted the clauses as
a policy item in the mid-1990s, spontaneous or ‘stealth’ innovation was not an option.
If nothing else, official attention made unanimity salient and CACs deviant in New York.
Recent experience also raises questions concerning the difference between New York
and London markets. Some of the lawyers we interviewed suggested that London was
simply more flexible than New York. This seems plausible inasmuch as we have seen a
surprising level of adoption of New York drafting conventions in London, with no
comparable breadth of diffusion of London forms in New York.58 London-based lawyers
involved in recent issues noted that they researched official and trade association models,
along with precedents from both English and New York law contracts. They appeared to
regard all four as equally useful—but none more authoritative than the other. They
regarded Mexico’s 2003 issue as less of a revolution than a data point. If this attitude
turns out to be widespread, it may indicate a new level of market integration
and pluralism: creative lawyers mix and match boilerplate from diverse sources, and
alter it to meet their clients’ needs. We may also be seeing a decline of independent
New York and London styles of drafting contracts.
The apparent difference in innovation practices between the London and New York
markets requires further explanation. Our contacts suggested a number of possible
factors that might account for the difference, though none appeared definitive. Despite
mergers, alliances and expansions into each other’s markets, US and UK firms have
different cultures and business models. The London market is also more concentrated.
But none of these features clearly favour a specific model of innovation. One senior
lawyer suggested the difference may lie in training. Most US lawyers doing sovereign
work have a securities or corporate law background, which makes them more sensitive to
disclosure and fiduciary concerns, and perhaps more hesitant to experiment. UK lawyers
in the field are more likely to come from banking law and contracting. Our findings thus
far do not give us enough to speculate as to which of these possible explanations, if any,
are driving the apparent differences in contract innovation. But there is enough to suggest
that it is dangerous to assume that the dynamics of innovation in the two markets are
the same.
In the end, we come full circle to the definition of boilerplate, how it comes into being,
how it changes and how it relates to the bespoke terms. In the case of CACs, we saw
a standard term that became dislodged under official pressure, but that in many respects
failed to re-standardize around a new model. It is uncertain whether we are witnessing
58 Grenada’s New York law issuance is an exception: Buchheit, representing Grenada, adopted the English law convention of
vesting individual holders’ right to sue with the trustee.
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an interim ‘period of ferment’ en route to new boilerplate, or a longer term move away
from standardization and to customization for a subset of sovereign bond terms. Early
boilerplate theories noted that so-called boilerplate contracts contain some combination
of customized and standardized terms. Recent experience in London suggests that terms
may, depending on circumstances, move in and out of being customized or standardized.
This does not rule out an element of inadvertence in the migration of truly standardized
terms; future research should help distinguish inadvertent diffusion, deliberate boilerplate
innovation and customization.
In March 2007, Slovenia issued E1 billion in notes that included majority modification
provisions, the option of amendment at a meeting or by written resolution, and an
engagement clause providing for creditor committees on the industry model. The issue
was governed by Slovenian law. While we were unable to ascertain the prior state of
Slovenian law boilerplate, we suspect that its 2007 contracts were the product of quiet
innovation within the past decade.
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